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Summary
In response to the 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC prepared for the potential introduction of
Ebola into the United States. The immediate goals were to rapidly identify and isolate any cases of Ebola, prevent transmission, and
promote timely treatment of affected patients. CDC’s technical expertise and the collaboration of multiple partners in state, local, and
municipal public health departments; health care facilities; emergency medical services; and U.S. government agencies were essential to
the domestic preparedness and response to the Ebola epidemic and relied on longstanding partnerships. CDC established a comprehensive
response that included two new strategies: 1) active monitoring of travelers arriving from countries affected by Ebola and other persons
at risk for Ebola and 2) a tiered system of hospital facility preparedness that enabled prioritization of training. CDC rapidly deployed a
diagnostic assay for Ebola virus (EBOV) to public health laboratories. Guidance was developed to assist in evaluation of patients possibly
infected with EBOV, for appropriate infection control, to support emergency responders, and for handling of infectious waste. CDC rapid
response teams were formed to provide assistance within 24 hours to a health care facility managing a patient with Ebola. As a result of
the collaborations to rapidly identify, isolate, and manage Ebola patients and the extensive preparations to prevent spread of EBOV, the
United States is now better prepared to address the next global infectious disease threat.
The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners
(http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

Background
As the epidemic of Ebola virus disease (Ebola) unfolded
in West Africa in 2014, CDC prepared for the possible
introduction of Ebola into the United States. The immediate
objectives were to rapidly identify and isolate any cases of
Ebola, prevent transmission of Ebola virus (EBOV), and ensure
timely treatment of affected patients within the United States.

CDC also sought to inform and prepare partners in the U.S.
health care and public health systems.
In summer 2014, the lack of easy access to a diagnostic
assay for EBOV complicated preparations for management of
a patient with Ebola seeking care at any of the approximately
6,500 urgent-care clinics and 5,000 acute-care hospitals in the
50 states and the U.S. territories. Preparing the U.S. health care
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system to handle a rare but often fatal illness for which most
clinicians and public health providers had no experience was
daunting, particularly given the public’s expectation that there
should be zero risk that a person who has Ebola could enter
the country. Furthermore, providers needed to be educated
on how to identify and isolate patients with suspected Ebola
in a way that minimized the delay of appropriate medical care
for more common and often serious illnesses (e.g., malaria) in
travelers from West Africa.
Achieving readiness for the possibility that a person with
Ebola could enter the United States required extensive
collaboration with state and local public health officials,
doctors and nurses in health care settings ranging from small
clinics to large hospitals, hospital administrators, emergency
responders, federal agencies, and transportation officials. This
report describes the U.S. approach to achieving domestic Ebola
readiness and response capacity and highlights key successes
and unique challenges of the multiple facets of this process.

U.S. Preparations for Possible
Importation of Ebola and the Impact
of the First Confirmed Case
During summer 2014, while the Ebola epidemic raged
approximately 5,000 miles away, CDC used health advisories
and conference calls with public health partners and health care
professionals to educate providers about Ebola and to encourage
vigilance for imported cases of Ebola in the United States. On
July 9, 2014, CDC activated its Emergency Operations Center
(EOC), enabling a coordinated domestic and international
response. Recognizing the need to diagnose Ebola quickly,
CDC identified and distributed to state and local public health
laboratories a laboratory assay that could reliably detect infection
with the EBOV strain circulating in West Africa. CDC contacted
the U.S. Department of Defense, which had an assay prepared
for Emergency Use Authorization by the Food and Drug
Administration, and worked with the Department of Defense
and the Association of Public Health Laboratories to rapidly
introduce and validate the assay in public health laboratories
through the Laboratory Response Network (1).
In the early months of the EOC’s activation, CDC updated and
posted prevention guidance developed for multiple audiences,
including hospitals where travelers with suspected exposures to
EBOV could seek care, emergency medical service providers, air
medical transport operators, aircraft crew and airport personnel,
laboratorians handling specimens from patients with suspected
Ebola, and mortuary workers (Table 1). U.S. hospitals were
considered to be capable of safely managing patients with Ebola
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(i.e., similar to the domestic experience treating patients with
other viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Marburg and Lassa)
if recommendations for isolation of patients, appropriate use
of personal protective equipment (PPE), and environmental
cleaning and disinfection were followed.
On September 25, 2014, a man who had recently traveled to
the United States from Liberia became symptomatic (i.e., fever,
headache, and abdominal pain) and sought care at a hospital in
Dallas, Texas. His illness was diagnosed as presumed sinusitis
(2); he was treated and discharged to home (Table 2). On
September 28, he was transported by ambulance to the hospital
because of persistent fever and progressive symptoms and was
hospitalized; on September 30, he became the first patient
to have laboratory-confirmed EBOV infection diagnosed
in the United States. Health officials from CDC and Texas
subsequently identified 48 persons who had contact with him
before his isolation at the hospital and began monitoring them
for early signs of infection (3).
Within 7 days after the patient’s death, on October 8, Ebola
symptoms developed in two nurses directly involved in his care,
and they were confirmed to have Ebola (secondary cases) (2).
Neither nurse reported an unprotected exposure to infectious
blood or body fluids. A total of 147 health care workers who
were involved in the care of the index patient or the two
secondary cases (regardless of PPE used) were therefore closely
monitored for 21 days after their last exposure to an Ebola
patient (3). Ebola did not develop in any community or health
care–related contacts of the three Ebola patients, including the
family members with whom the index patient was living before
hospitalization. Both nurses subsequently recovered (2).

Assisting the U.S. Clinical Community
After diagnosis of the three Ebola cases in Texas, requests for
clinical consultation and general guidance from CDC increased,
peaking at 227 calls per week in mid-October. The most frequent
requests were for assistance in determining whether a patient
fit the criteria for a person under investigation,* therefore
warranting evaluation for Ebola. In most (75%) situations, the
patients had no identifiable risk factors for Ebola (4). For these
inquiries, CDC typically offered reassurance, confirming that
the patient was actually not at risk for Ebola, and encouraged
providers to provide timely routine medical care.
* 1)

Fever (subjective or temperature ≥100.4°F or ≥38.0°C) or symptoms,
including severe headache, fatigue, muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal
pain, or unexplained hemorrhage AND 2) epidemiologic risk factors including
contact with an Ebola patient or patient’s body fluids or travel to a country
affected by Ebola within 21 days of symptom onset (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/healthcare-us/evaluating-patients/case-definition.html).
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TABLE 1. Key CDC guidance documents for use in domestic preparedness and response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa — United States,
2014–2016
Category
Public health preparedness
and response
Hospital preparedness

Clinical guidance

Laboratory guidance

Infection control and waste
management

Patient transportation

Document
Case Definition for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/evaluating-patients/case-definition.html
Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html
Preparing for Ebola—a Tiered Approach (includes Preparing Frontline Healthcare Facilities; Preparing Ebola Assessment Hospitals;
Preparedness Checklists): http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/index.html
Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Hospitalized Patients Under Investigation (PUIs) for Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD) in U.S. Hospitals: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/hospitals/infection-control.html
Guidance for U.S. Laboratories for Managing and Testing Routine Clinical Specimens When There Is a Concern About Ebola Virus
Disease: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/laboratories/safe-specimen-management.html
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Information for Clinicians in U.S. Healthcare Settings: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/
preparing/clinicians.html
Guidance on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Be Used by Healthcare Workers During Management of Patients with Confirmed
Ebola or Persons Under Investigation (PUIs) for Ebola Who Are Clinically Unstable or Have Bleeding, Vomiting, or Diarrhea in U.S.
Hospitals, Including Procedures for Donning and Doffing PPE: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/ppe/guidance.html
For U.S. Healthcare Settings: Donning and Doffing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Evaluating Persons Under Investigation
(PUIs) for Ebola Who Are Clinically Stable and Do Not Have Bleeding, Vomiting, or Diarrhea: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/
healthcare-us/ppe/guidance-clinically-stable-puis.html
Interim Guidance for Management of Survivors of Ebola Virus Disease in U.S. Healthcare Settings:
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/evaluating-patients/guidance-for-management-of-survivors-ebola.html
Guidance for U.S. Laboratories for Managing and Testing Routine Clinical Specimens When There Is a Concern About Ebola Virus
Disease: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/laboratories/safe-specimen-management.html
Collection, Transport, and Submission of Specimens for Ebola Virus Testing: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/
laboratories/specimens.html
Interim Guidance for Environmental Infection Control in Hospitals for Ebola Virus: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/
cleaning/hospitals.html
Ebola Waste Management: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/cleaning/waste-management.html
Procedures for Safe Handling and Management of Ebola-Associated Waste: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/cleaning/
handling-waste.html
Interim Guidance for U.S. Residence Decontamination for Ebola and Removal of Contaminated Waste: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/prevention/cleaning-us-homes.html
Interim Guidance for Ebola Virus Cleaning, Disinfection, and Waste Disposal in Commercial Passenger Aircraft: http://www.cdc.gov/
vhf/ebola/prevention/cleaning-commercial-passenger-aircraft.html
Interim Guidance for Managers and Workers Handling Untreated Sewage from Individuals with Ebola in the United States: http://
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/prevention/handling-sewage.html
Guidance for Safe Handling of Human Remains of Ebola Patients in U.S. Hospitals and Mortuaries: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/
healthcare-us/hospitals/handling-human-remains.html
Guidance on Air Medical Transport for Patients with Ebola Virus Disease: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergencyservices/air-medical-transport.html
Interim Guidance for Emergency Medical Services Systems and 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Points for Management of Patients
Under Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease in the United States: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergencyservices/ems-systems.html
Guidance on Air Medical Transport for Patients with Ebola Virus Disease: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergencyservices/air-medical-transport.html
Interim Guidance for Emergency Medical Services Systems and 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Points for Management of Patients
Under Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease in the United States: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergencyservices/ems-systems.html
Guidance for Developing a Plan for Interfacility Transport of Persons Under Investigation or Confirmed Patients with Ebola Virus
Disease in the United States: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergency-services/interfacility-transport.html

Abbreviation: Ebola = Ebola virus disease.

Patients who were isolated and evaluated for suspected Ebola
were likely to experience delays in evaluation for and treatment of
common but often serious (non-Ebola) illnesses. Basic diagnostic
laboratory tests (e.g., complete blood counts, serum chemistries,
malaria smears) and radiologic studies were often delayed for
>2–3 days while patients were tested for EBOV (4). Although
rapid identification and isolation (or transfer) of persons with
suspected Ebola were important, so was the need to complete
diagnostic testing quickly to enable proper management of other
potentially life-threatening conditions (e.g., malaria, malignant

hypertension, ectopic pregnancy) among persons arriving in the
United States from West Africa (4).
Several reasons existed for this reluctance — or in some cases,
refusal — to run basic diagnostic tests. The most recent (2009)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
manual of biosafety (5) states that clinical specimens from
persons with suspected Ebola should be manipulated only in
a biosafety level (BSL)-4 facility, but most clinical laboratories
are BSL-2. During the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic, CDC
updated its guidance for handling clinical specimens outside
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TABLE 2. Abbreviated timeline of the domestic response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa — United States, 2014–2016
Date
2014
July 9
August 2
August 7
September 20
September 25
September 28
September 30
October 8
October 11–16
October 11
October 12

October 14
October 15
October 16
October 19
October 20
October 21
October 23
October 24
October 27
October 28
October 29
October 30
October 31
November 3
November 7
November 10
November 11
November 17
December 2
2015
May 9
June 29
September 3
November 7
November 19
December 29
2016
January 14
February 19
March 17
April 1–4

Event
CDC EOC is activated to support Ebola response.
HCW with Ebola diagnosed in West Africa is admitted to Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia.
First version of CDC Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure posted.
Businessman from Liberia arrives in Dallas, Texas, after negative fever screening on departure from Liberia and entry into United States.
After 1 day of symptoms, Liberian businessman seeks care at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, is treated for presumed sinusitis and
discharged.
Liberian businessman remains ill, is admitted to hospital.
Ebola diagnosed in Liberian businessman; he becomes first person with Ebola diagnosed in the United States.
CDC and Texas health officials begin contact tracing and identify 48 total possible or confirmed contacts of the U.S. index patient before his
isolation at the hospital; active monitoring of these contacts begins.
First person with Ebola diagnosed in the United States dies.
CDC and CBP begin enhanced entry risk assessment and management at five U.S. airports (JFK: October 11; EWR, IAD, ORD, and ATL: October 16)
that receive approximately 94% of travelers from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
A nurse (nurse 1) who provided care for the Ebola patient in Dallas develops fever, seeks care in an emergency department; Ebola is diagnosed.
CDC and Texas health officials begin active monitoring of household contact of nurse 1.
CDC begins active monitoring of 76 hospital workers who treated first patient with Ebola diagnosed in the United States.
Active monitoring begins for all 147 HCW contacts of any of the Ebola patients, irrespective of PPE use; monitoring continues until 21 days from
their last exposure.
A second nurse (nurse 2) who provided care for the Ebola patient in Dallas develops fever and is hospitalized.
CDC, Texas, and Ohio health officials begin contact tracing of contacts of nurse 2 and active monitoring of three household contacts.
Ebola is diagnosed in nurse 2, who is transferred to Emory University Hospital in Atlanta.
CDC notifies a domestic airline that a passenger (nurse 2) who traveled from Cleveland, Ohio, to Dallas on October 13 tested positive for EBOV.
Nurse 1 is transferred from Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital to the National Institutes of Health hospital in Bethesda, Maryland.
CDC REP teams begin visits to U.S. hospitals to provide technical assistance.
CDC revises guidance on PPE for U.S. HCWs caring for Ebola patients.
CBP announces that all travelers from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone will be routed to one of five participating U.S. airports for enhanced entry
risk assessment and management.
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene diagnoses Ebola in an HCW (HCW 1) who had returned to New York City from Guinea;
patient is isolated at Bellevue Hospital.
CDC and New York City health officials begin contact tracing of HCW 1’s contacts before isolation at the hospital.
An asymptomatic HCW (HCW 2) who returned to the United States after treating patients in Sierra Leone is isolated by New Jersey officials at a
nearby hospital.
CDC issues revised Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure.
Active postarrival monitoring begins for travelers from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
HCW 2 is released from quarantine and drives from New Jersey to Maine.
Nurse 2 is discharged from Emory hospital after being declared Ebola virus free.
Monitoring is completed for 47 of 48 initial contacts of Dallas index patient.
Maine judge issues a 1-day court-ordered restriction of HCW 2’s movements.
Active monitoring is completed for passengers and crew on October 10 airline flight (Dallas to Cleveland) on which nurse 2 traveled.
HCW 2 agrees to daily monitoring by Maine state health department.
Active monitoring is completed for passengers and crew on October 13 airline flight (Cleveland to Dallas) on which nurse 2 traveled.
Active monitoring is completed for all 177 contacts of Ebola patient in Dallas and nurses 1 and 2 (some persons were contacts of more than one
patient) after completing 21 days of monitoring; Ebola did not develop in any contacts.
Active monitoring of HCW 2 is discontinued.
HCW 1 is discharged from Bellevue Hospital in New York City.
Travelers from Mali are routed to one of five U.S. airports for enhanced entry risk assessment and management.
Guidance is released for tiered approach to health care facility preparedness.
WHO declares end of the Ebola epidemic in Liberia.
New cases of Ebola are reported in Liberia.
WHO declares Liberia free of EBOV transmission for the second time.
WHO declares Sierra Leone free of EBOV transmission.
New cases of Ebola are reported in Liberia.
WHO declares Guinea free of EBOV transmission.
WHO declares Liberia free of EBOV transmission for the third time.
U.S. government discontinues enhanced entry screening procedures and airline routing for Ebola.
CDC retires the Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure.
New cases of Ebola are reported in Guinea.
New cases of Ebola are reported in Liberia.

Abbreviations: ATL = Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International Airport; CBP = Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Ebola = Ebola
virus disease; EBOV = Ebola virus; EOC = Emergency Operations Center; EWR = Newark Liberty International Airport; HCW = health care worker; IAD = Washington
Dulles International Airport; JFK = John F. Kennedy International Airport (New York City); ORD = Chicago O’Hare International Airport; PPE = personal protective
equipment; REP = Rapid Ebola Preparedness; WHO = World Health Organization.
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of a BSL-4 facility, but many laboratories considered the
longstanding BSL-4 recommendation more appropriate.
Also, clinical laboratories were concerned about the risk for
aerosolization from instruments in highly automated clinical
laboratories. Although CDC, and later other laboratories,
provided guidance on conducting routine clinical laboratory
tests using biosafety cabinets and point-of-care instruments
(Table 1), many laboratories were not able to put these
specialized systems in place.
CDC collaborated with other U.S. government partners,
researchers, and manufacturers of medical countermeasures
to assist health care providers with clinical management of
Ebola patients in the United States. In early August 2014,
Emory University Hospital (Atlanta, Georgia) hospitalized
and treated the first Ebola patient medically evacuated to the
United States (Table 2). During August 2014–March 2015,
seven persons (six health care personnel and one journalist)
who had Ebola diagnosed in West Africa were transported to
the United States for clinical management; one died. These
were in addition to two cases of Ebola diagnosed among
persons traveling to the United States from countries affected
by Ebola (the Dallas traveler and a health care worker who
returned to New York City after working in Guinea) and the
secondary EBOV infections in two nurses in Dallas (2,6).
Extensive information sharing among clinicians managing
these patients at the three specialized U.S. treatment centers,†
Bellevue Hospital in New York City, Texas Health Presbyterian
Hospital in Dallas, and hospitals in Europe contributed to
substantial progress in understanding the clinical spectrum,
complications, virology, and clinical management of Ebola,
as well as the use of postexposure prophylaxis and medical
countermeasures (2,7–11).
CDC’s outreach to clinicians included 1) directly assisting
clinicians managing Ebola patients and Ebola survivors in
the United States and sharing updated information with
the general clinical community, including U.S. personnel
deployed to the Monrovia Medical Unit in Liberia (12–15);
2) assisting with coordination of medical evacuations of
Ebola patients who were U.S. citizens or legal permanent
residents from West Africa to the specialized U.S. treatment
centers (7–9); 3) working with clinical and federal partners
to further the development of investigational therapeutic
drugs for Ebola patients; and 4) coordinating information
sharing among clinicians managing Ebola patients in the
United States and Europe (16).

Ensuring Early Identification
by Tracking Travelers and
Tracking Contacts of Persons with
Confirmed Ebola
During October 11–16, 2014, shortly after the patient from
Liberia died, staff with CDC and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
began enhanced entry risk assessment and management
at five U.S. airports that received approximately 94% of
travelers from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (17). This
enhanced assessment followed growing concern that traveler
self-monitoring might be insufficient to rapidly identify
potential cases of Ebola (6). After travelers from countries
affected by Ebola were screened for symptoms of Ebola and
assigned an assessment of their personal risk, the responsibility
for monitoring asymptomatic travelers for whom exposure
to EBOV could not be ruled out and who were still in the
21-day incubation period was transferred from CDC to state
and local public health partners. On October 21, 2014, CBP
announced that all travelers from countries affected by Ebola
were to be routed to one of five participating U.S. airports,
enabling a standard approach to enhanced entry risk assessment
of travelers and rendering the program more manageable.
CDC’s Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement
of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure, initially issued
in August 2014 and revised October 27,§ recommended that
state, local, and territorial health agencies actively contact
persons with specific risk factors for Ebola daily for the
21-day incubation period to assess them for symptoms and
fever (18). Persons at low risk for Ebola (e.g., travelers from
countries affected by Ebola without a known exposure) were
asked to monitor their temperature twice a day, self-evaluate
symptoms, and report daily to the designated health agency
(active monitoring). Persons at high risk for exposure to EBOV
(e.g., persons in contact with blood or other body fluids of
known Ebola patients without proper PPE; health care workers
who cared for patients even while using appropriate PPE) were
to be under direct active monitoring; public health agencies
conducted direct active monitoring for fever and symptoms
twice daily, including direct observation by a public health
official at least once a day. Each state and territory developed
a plan to 1) monitor persons with possible EBOV exposure
and locate those lost to follow-up and manage those who
were noncompliant; 2) establish a 24/7 telephone number

† Specialized

treatment centers: Emory University Serious Communicable
Diseases Unit, Atlanta, Georgia; the National Institutes of Health Clinical
Center, Bethesda, Maryland; and the University of Nebraska Biocontainment
Unit, Omaha, Nebraska.

§ Initial

movement and monitoring guidance was posted on August 22, 2014;
the guidance was reviewed and revised as needed throughout the response; the
most recent guidance is available at http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/
monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html.
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for persons with symptoms to call; 3) establish and practice
systems (e.g., emergency medical services [EMS]) to ensure
the safe transport of ill persons to a health care facility; and
4) identify the hospital to which a person would be referred
should he or she become ill and ensure that the receiving health
care facility was prepared at minimum to evaluate, isolate, and
test (including collecting and shipping specimens) for Ebola.
Active monitoring of returning travelers and of health care
providers and contacts of Ebola patients managed in the
United States was a novel strategy introduced to facilitate early
detection of new cases in the setting of no or minimal U.S.
domestic transmission. Within 7 days after issuance of the
revised CDC guidance in October 2014, all 50 states and two
local jurisdictions were effectively monitoring travelers arriving
from countries affected by Ebola and health care workers caring
for Ebola patients in the United States (19). Approximately
29,000 persons were monitored from October 2014 through
December 2015.
Nationwide implementation of this active monitoring system
brought many challenges. Additional resources were needed to
rapidly establish and staff 24/7 call numbers and to develop
plans for effective daily observation of each person under
direct active monitoring (including those living in remote
places) (17). CDC awarded $145 million of supplemental
Ebola funds to support the resulting substantial increase
in staffing needs. Monitoring travelers moving across state
lines required coordination among state health departments.
Health departments and CDC were expected to achieve 100%
accountability for all travelers; several health departments
creatively used social media and police missing person units
to find persons lost to follow-up. Also, a number of states
elected to implement much more restrictive policies than
recommended by CDC, resulting in inconsistencies among
state-specific policies (6). Several states used existing laws
requiring monitoring, with legal penalties for those not in
compliance. For example, a nurse returning from treating
patients in Sierra Leone (and asymptomatic) was quarantined
in a New Jersey hospital for nearly 3 days (Table 2). Although
the average rate of successful active monitoring reached
approximately 99% by early March 2015 (19), this approach
detected no new confirmed Ebola cases. Throughout this
process, CDC maintained regular and frequent contact with
partners to build a closer and better integrated response among
federal, state, and local public health officials. During the
height of the response, some federal public health partners
embedded staff within CDC and the EOC.
On February 19, 2016, when more than 45 days had passed since
Guinea was declared free of EBOV transmission and widespread
human-to-human transmission was at an end, the interim guidance
was retired. CDC will consider the need for similar guidance during
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future outbreaks on the basis of the situation, taking into account
the extent of the outbreak and the risk of importation and spread
of disease into the United States (18).

A Tiered Approach to
Hospital Readiness
During the early phase of the epidemic in West Africa, any
U.S. facility with trained staff, isolation room capacity, and
appropriate supplies and equipment was considered capable
of caring for a patient with Ebola. However, because of the
complexity of care and strict attention to infection control
(20) required for safe treatment of Ebola patients, highlighted
by secondary EBOV transmission to the two nurses in Texas,
CDC determined that ensuring adequately trained staff,
availability of designated space, and adequate specialized PPE
might not be possible in all inpatient facilities throughout the
entire U.S. health care system. This level of preparation was
critical for facilities most likely to receive patients for evaluation
of Ebola. Also, the likelihood of a person with possible Ebola
seeking care in an emergency department or hospital was not
equally distributed among all hospitals in the United States
for several reasons. Many travelers from West Africa lived in
or visited specific regions of the country, travelers who were
symptomatic on arrival to the United States were directed to
specific hospitals near one of the five airports, and all persons
under active monitoring by state public health officials could be
directed to a particular hospital for evaluation if they developed
symptoms during their monitoring period.
CDC and the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) developed a three-tiered
approach to prepare U.S. acute health care facilities to safely
and rapidly identify, isolate, evaluate, manage, and transfer (if
needed) persons under investigation or patients with confirmed
Ebola (21). The three tiers were frontline health care facilities,
Ebola assessment hospitals, and Ebola treatment centers
(Figure). CDC aimed to establish a limited number of Ebola
treatment centers strategically in regions of the United States
most likely to identify a person with Ebola.
Difficulties initially encountered included the few facilities
with personnel trained to provide the complex care needed
by Ebola patients, the limited number of facilities capable of
managing children with Ebola, and a hesitancy of some facilities
capable of providing care to Ebola patients to be identified
publicly or to accept patients from other states. In addition, not
all health care workers were trained in or familiar with using
the specialized PPE recommended for care of Ebola patients.
Some facilities struggled to identify dedicated space that was
appropriately configured for Ebola management, and many
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FIGURE. Tiered approach for U.S. hospital and health care facility* preparedness for Ebola

Tier

Frontline
Health Care
Facility

Capabilities
•
•
•

Quickly identifies and isolates patients with possible Ebola
Notifies facility infection control and state and local public
health officials
Has enough Ebola PPE for at least 12–24 hours of care

Prepares for patient transfer, if needed
Persons under active
monitoring who
develop signs and
symptoms
compatible with
Ebola are referred
for evaluation and
possible testing by
state or local public
health officials to an
Ebola assessment
hospital or Ebola
treatment center

Ebola
Assessment
Hospital

•
•
•

•

Safely receives and isolates a patient with possible Ebola
Provides immediate laboratory evaluation and coordinates
testing for Ebola virus
Cares for a patient for up to 5 days (including evaluation
and management of alternative diagnoses) until Ebola
diagnosis is confirmed or ruled out
Has enough Ebola PPE for up to 5 days of care

Transfers a patient with confirmed Ebola to an Ebola
treatment center in consultation with public health officials
•

Ebola
Treatment
Center

•
•
•

Safely receives, isolates and cares for a patient with confirmed
Ebola for duration of illness
Has sustainable staffing plan to manage several weeks of care
Has CDC Ebola Response Teams ready to provide assistance as
needed
Has enough Ebola PPE for at least 7 days of care (will restock
as needed)

All of the health care facilities will be prepared to do the following:
•
•
•

Ensure staff are appropriately trained and have documented competency in safe PPE practices
Have systems in place to safely manage waste disposal, cleaning, and disinfection
Adhere to infection control protocols

Source: CDC; available at http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/hospitals.html.
Abbreviations: Ebola = Ebola virus disease; PPE = personal protective equipment.
* Ebola treatment center includes regional treatment centers for Ebola and other special pathogens.

facilities had substantial problems acquiring sufficient quantities
and types of PPE (e.g., an Ebola treatment center should have a
5-day supply of PPE for a team of six nurses, three doctors, two
laboratory technicians, two observers, and one environmental
specialist for one to three shifts per day, depending on the health
care worker’s role). Initially, PPE was ordered by facilities in high
volumes with little strategic guidance, resulting in substantial
delays in filling of orders and national shortages for some items.
Manufacturers and distributors struggled to determine how
much to increase production and how to prioritize orders and
allocate limited resources.

CDC and ASPR, in collaboration with state and local public
health authorities, produced detailed guidance for outpatient
and inpatient facilities about managing persons under
investigation and persons with confirmed Ebola (Table 1).
Hospital Preparedness Program funding (22) was provided to
states and eligible municipalities to improve surge capacity,
including building needed infrastructure within health care
systems, retrofitting hospitals to establish safe places to treat
patients with Ebola, and reimbursement of care costs for
confirmed Ebola patients. CDC also assembled Rapid Ebola
Preparedness (REP) teams to assess infection control readiness
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of facilities interested in serving as Ebola treatment centers
and provided on-site technical assistance regarding staffing,
improvement in infection control, worker safety, laboratory
processes, diagnostics, waste management, and other key areas.
Initially, the REP teams provided direct technical assistance to
hospitals near airports with a large number of persons traveling
from countries that had widespread EBOV transmission and in
communities where these travelers or large numbers of persons
from West African countries reside. Beginning in October
2014, REP teams traveled to approximately 80 U.S. hospitals
to provide technical support.
During October–December 2014, after extensive
preparations, 55 hospital facilities were designated Ebola
treatment centers by state health officers in collaboration with
hospital administrators. These facilities received direct CDC
and HHS technical assistance and formulated comprehensive
plans outlining policies and procedures for managing patients
with confirmed Ebola, which included training staff and
instituting infection control measures, acquiring equipment
and PPE, creating plans for managing waste, and designating
appropriate space to treat Ebola patients. By August 2015, 92%
of persons being monitored were within 200 miles of an Ebola
treatment center and within 50 miles of an assessment hospital.

CDC’s Ebola Response Teams
To improve the response capacity to EBOV infections in
the United States, CDC established teams capable of rapidly
providing on-site assistance to any health care facility treating
a confirmed or probable case of Ebola. These CDC Ebola
response teams could be immediately deployed to provide
technical assistance for infection control procedures, clinical
care, logistics of managing a patient with Ebola, contact
tracing, and media relations (23).

Emergency Medical Services
Success of the three-tiered health care system plan rested
on safe and rapid transport of a person under investigation
or patient with confirmed Ebola to a designated facility
to be evaluated or treated. EMS responders faced multiple
challenges, such as the potential to enter uncontrolled
environments including homes and public areas with little or
no information about the patient’s risk factors and the need
to transport patients over long distances during which the
patient’s condition could worsen. Lack of experience with
Ebola and limited access to appropriate PPE encountered early
in the U.S. response compounded these challenges.
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CDC collaborated with federal partners to rapidly develop
guidance for EMS systems and 9-1-1 public safety answering
points for managing persons under investigation or patients
with confirmed Ebola (Table 1). CDC also hosted conference
calls to provide a forum for EMS providers from Emory
University Hospital and the University of Nebraska Medical
Center to share their experiences transporting Ebola patients.
Further guidance addressing the complexities of interfacility and
interstate transport of persons under investigation and patients
with confirmed Ebola was developed in collaboration with ASPR
and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Table 1).

Environmental and Waste Management
All levels of health care facilities and EMS providers needed
plans for the transport and disposal of waste generated by
either persons under investigation or persons with confirmed
Ebola. Fear, public perception, and the regulatory framework
around handling Ebola-associated wastes proved to be common
issues. These issues were encountered in health care facilities,
patients’ homes, businesses that the patients frequented early
in their disease, and a commercial passenger aircraft on which
one patient flew while ill.
Although EBOV is susceptible to both physical and chemical
inactivation, it is classified as a category A infectious substance¶
because of its associated high mortality rate. Therefore, items
that are or might be contaminated must be treated onsite or
packaged and transported to a hazardous waste or medical waste
treatment site by a carrier with a special DOT permit. Once
treated, the waste is no longer infectious and can be managed
in accordance with state and local regulations regarding solid
wastes. Unforeseen was the volume of waste generated, most
of which was used PPE, and the packaging required for the
waste because the packaging used was too large for the doors
of most incinerators.
During the Ebola response, CDC collaborated with
federal and state agencies and multiple other private and
nongovernmental organizations to develop guidance for cleaning
and disinfection applicable to various settings that included
patient residences, commercial passenger and medical transport
aircraft, ambulances, and health care facilities. Other guidance
covered handling of medical, laboratory, liquid, and other wastes
and the protection of waste handlers and sewage and wastewater
workers from contact with untreated human wastes (Table 1).
¶ DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR, 49 CFR, Parts 171-180); Ebola

virus is classified as a category A infectious substance by the DOT and the
United Nations. Category A refers to an infectious substance in a form capable
of causing permanent disability or life-threatening or fatal disease in otherwise
healthy humans or animals.
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Conclusion
Coordination of preparedness efforts among CDC and state
and local public health entities, health care organizations, and
other HHS partners, the product of longstanding partnerships,
was central to the rapid implementation of a comprehensive
U.S. domestic response. The United States quickly deployed
laboratory testing for EBOV. The closely integrated system of
U.S. border entry risk assessment and postarrival monitoring
was pivotal to reducing public concern and facilitating active,
timely management of symptomatic travelers. Vulnerabilities
in infection control capacity exposed during the early outbreak
response resulted in ongoing intensive efforts for improvements
at the national, state, and local levels. The importance of
support functions (e.g., waste management, laboratory testing,
and EMS), which are needed to successfully care for patients
with a complex, unfamiliar, and often fatal disease such as
Ebola, have been underscored. The tiered approach to health
care preparedness for Ebola highlighted the critical functions
needed at each level and made possible the prioritization of
training and other interventions. This tiered approach is likely
to be transferable to the next public health response to future
threats; nine regional treatment centers designated by HHS
to become special regional treatment centers for patients with
Ebola have enhanced capabilities that can be used to treat
patients with other severe, highly infectious diseases. The
United States is now better prepared and continues to work
to strengthen and support rapid and successful responses to
the next infectious disease threat.
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